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access agreements in the telecommunications sector. 
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interested parties. 
The Commission invites interested parties to submit their possible observations they may 
have on the draft Notice published hereunder. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.  The timetable  for  full  liberalization in  the telecommunications sector has now been 
established, and Member States arc to  remove the  last barriers  to  the provision of 
telecommunications services in a competitive environment to consumers by 1 January 
1998
1
•  As a result of this liberalization a second set of related products or services 
will  emerge as  well  as the  need  for  access to  facilities  necessary to provide these 
services.  In this sector, interconnection to  the public switched telecommunications 
network is  a typical example of such access.  The Commission has stated that it  will 
define the treatment of access agreements under the competition rules
2
•  This Notice, 
therefore, addresses the issue of how competition rules and procedures apply to access 
agreements  in  the  context  of  harmonised  EU  and  national  regulation  in  the 
telecommunications sector. 
2.  The regulatory framework for the liberalization of telecommunications consists of the 
liberalization directives issued under Article 90 EC and the Open Network Provision 
(ONP) framework.  The ONP framework provides harmonised rules for access and 
interconnection to the telecommunications networks and the voice telephony services. 
The legal framework provided by the liberalization and harmonization legislation is 
the  background  to  any  action  taken  by  the  Commission in  its  application  of the 
competition  rules.  Both  the  liberalization  legislation
3  and  the  harmonization 
legislation
4 are aimed at ensuring the attainment of the objectives of the Community 
2 
3 
4 
According to Directive 96/1 9/EC and 96/2/EC, certain Member States may request a derogation 
from fullliberalisation for certain limited periods.  See:  Commission Decision of 27 November 
1996  concerning  the  additional  implementation  periods  requested  by  Ireland  for  the 
implementation of Commission Directives 90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC as regards full competition 
in the telecommunications markets.  This Notice is without prejudice to such derogations, and 
the Commission will take account of the existence of any such derogation when applying the 
competition rules to access agreements, as described in this Notice. 
Communication  by  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament and  the  Council, 
Consultation  on  the  Green  Paper  on  the  liberalisation  of  telecommunications 
infrastructure and cable television networks,  COM  (95)  158 final,  3 May 1995. 
Commission  Directive  88/301/EEC,  on  competition  in  the  markets  in 
telecommunicatk>ns  terminal equipment, OJ  L  131/73 (1988); 
Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC,  on  competition  in  the  markets  for 
telecommunications services, OJ  L 192/10 (1 990); 
Commission  Directive  94/46/EC,  amending  Directive  88/301/EEC  and  Directive 
90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications, OJ L 268/15 (  1994  ); 
Commission Directive 95/51/EC,  amending  Directive 90/388/EEC with regard  to  the 
abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable television networks for the provision of 
already liberalised telecommunications services, OJ  L 256/49 (1 995); 
Commission Directive 96/2/EC, amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to mobile 
and  personal communications, OJ  L 20/59 (1996); 
Commission Directive 96/19/EC,  amending  Directive 90/388/EEC with regard  to  the 
implementation of full  competition  in  the  telecommunications  markets,  OJ  L  74/13 
(1996). 
Interconnection agreements are the most significant form of access agreement in the 
(continued ... ) 
\ \dr-cons.  wpd  ll Draft 
as laid out in Article 3 EC, and specifically, the establishment of "a system ensuring 
that  competition  in  the  internal market  is  not  distortetf'  and  "an internal  market 
characterised by  the  abolition,  as  between  Member States, of obstacles to  the  free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital". 
3.  The Commission has  published Guidelines on the  application of EEC competition 
rules  in  the telecommunications sector, OJ  C  233/2 ( 1991 ).  The present Notice is 
intended to build on those Guidelines, which do not deal explicitly with access issues. 
4.  In the telecommunications sector, liberalization and harmonization legislation permit 
and simplify  the  task of Community firms  in  embarking on  new activities  in  new 
markets and consequently allow users to  benefit from  increased competition.  These 
advantages must not he jeopardised by restrictive or abusive practices of undertakings: 
the Community's competition rules are therefore essential to ensure the completion of 
this development.  New entrants must in the initial stages he ensured the right to have 
access to  the networks of incumbent telecommunications operators (TOs).  Several 
authorities, at the regional, national and Community levels, have a role in regulating 
this sector.  If  the competition process is to work well in the Internal Market, effective 
coordination between these institutions must be ensured. 
5.  Part I of the Notice sets out the  legal  framework and details how the Commission 
intends to  achieve  its  intention of avoiding  unnecessary duplication of procedures 
while safeguarding the rights of undertakings and users under the competition rules. 
In this context, the Commission's efforts to encourage decentralised application of  the 
competition rules by national courts and national authorities aim at achieving remedies 
at a national level, unless a significant Community interest is involved in a particular 
case.  In the telecommunications sector, specific procedures in  the ONP framework 
likewise aim at resolving access problems in the first place at a decentralised, national 
level, with a further possibility for conciliation at Community level. Part II defines the 
Commission's  approach  to  market  definition  in  this  sector.  Part  III  details  the 
principles that the Commission will follow in the application of  the competition rules: 
\  .. continued) 
\ \dr-cons.  wpd 
telecommunications sector.  A basic framework for interconnection agreements is set 
up by the rules on  Open Network Provision (ONP), and the application of competition 
rules must be  seen against this background: 
Council  Directive  90/387/EEC,  on  the  establishment  of  the  internal  market  for 
telecommunications services through  the  implementation of open  network provision, 
OJ  L 192/1  (1990) 
Council Directive 92/44/EEC,  on  the application of open  network provision to leased 
lines, OJ  L 165/27 (1992); 
European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  95/62/EC,  on  the  application  of open 
network provision to voice telephony,  OJ  L 321/6 (  1995); 
Common Position for a European Parliament and Council Directive on interconnection 
in  telecommunications with  regard  to  ensuring  universal service and  interoperability 
through application of the principles of open network provision (ONP), OJ C220/13, 29 
July 1996. 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Council Directives 
90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive environment 
in telecommunications, Com(95) 543 final,  14.11.1995. 
2 6. 
7. 
5 
6 
Draft 
it aims to help telecommunications market participants shape their access agreements 
by explaining the competition law requirements. 
The Notice is  based on the  Commission's experience in  several cascs,
5  and  certain 
studies into this area carried out on behalf of the Commission
6
• 
This  Notice  docs  not  in  any  way  restrict  the  rights  conferred  on  individuals  or 
undertakings by Community law, and is without prejudice to any interpretation of the  · 
Community competition rules that may be given by the Court of First Instance or the 
European Court of Justice. 
In  the  telecommunications area,  notably Commission decision of 18  October 1991, 
Eirpage, OJ  L 306/22 (1991),  and Commission decisions of 17 July 1996, Atlas and 
Phoenix,  OJ  L  239/23 and  57  (1996).  There are also a number of pending cases 
involving access issues. 
Competition aspects of interconnection agreements in the telecommunications sector, 
June 1995;  Competition aspects of access by  service providers to  the  resources of 
telecommunications operators,  December 1995.  See  also Competition Aspects of 
Access Pricing, December 1995. 
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PART  I :  FRAMEWORK 
1.  Competition Rules and Sector Specific l{cgulation 
8.  Access  problems  in  the  broadest sense of the  word  (e.g.  provision  of leased  lines. 
interconnection to  networks. access to data concerning subscribers to  voice telephone 
services) can be dealt with at different levels and on the basis of a range of legislative 
provisions, of both national and Community origin.  A service provider faced with an 
access problem such as a TO's unjustilied refusal to  supply (or on reasonable terms) 
a  leased  line  needed  by  the  applicant  to  provide  services  to  its  customers  could 
therefore  contemplate  a  number  of routes  to  seck  a  remedy.  Generally  speaking, 
aggrieved parties will experience a number of bcnclits, at  least in  an  initial stage, in 
seeking redress at  a national  level.  At  a national  level,  the applicant has  two  main 
choices,  namely  (I)  spccitic  national  regulatory  procedures  now  established  in 
accordance with Community law and harmonised under Open Network Provision (see 
footnote 4)  and  (2) an  action  under national and/or Community law before a national 
court or national  competition authorit/. 
Complaints made to  the Commission under the competition rules  in  the  place of or in 
addition  to  national  courts.  national  competition  authorities  and/or  to  national 
regulatory  authorities  under  ONP  procedures  will  be  dealt  with  according  to  the 
priority which  they  deserve in  view of the  urgency,  novelty and  transnational nature 
of the  problem  involved  and  taking  into  account  the  need  to  avoid  duplicate 
proceeding (sec below, points  13  et seq.). 
\ \dr-cons. wpd 
In the case of the ONP leased line directive, ONP foresees the first stage which allows 
the aggrieved  user to  appeal to  the  National Regulatory Authority.  This can  offer a 
number of advantages.  In the telecommunications areas where experience has shown 
that companies are  often  hesitant  to  be  seen  as  complainants against the  TO  on 
which they heavily depend not only with respect to the specific point of conflict but also 
a much broader and far-reaching sense,  the  procedures foreseen under ONP are an 
attractive option.  ONP procedures furthermore can  cover a broader range of access 
problems than  could  be  approached on  the  basis of the  competition rules.  Finally, 
these  procedures  can  offer  users  the  advantage  of  proximity  and  familiarity  with 
national administrative procedures;  language is also a factor to be taken into account. 
Under ONP procedures,  if matters cannot be  resolved at the national level, a second 
stage is organised at the European level (conciliation procedure).  Pursuant to the ONP 
leased line directive, an agreement between the parties involved must then be reached 
within two months,  with a possible extension of one  month if the parties agree. 
It should be noted that in the Proposed ONP interconnection directive, as opposed to 
the  leased line directive, a conciliation procedure is foreseen  for transfrontier cases 
only,  that  is  interconnection  disputes  in  which  more  than  one  National  Regulatory 
Authority  is  involved.  If  the  National  Regulatory  Authorities  dealing  with  an 
interconnection problem do not reach a solution to the problem, then one of them may 
notify the Commission thereof and  invoke the conciliation procedure (Article 17 of the 
Proposed directive). 
4 Draft 
9.  The Commission recognises that National Regulatory Authoriticsx have different tasks, 
and operate  in  a  different  legal  framework  to  the  Commission.  First,  the  NRAs 
operate under national law, albeit often implementing European law.  Secondly, that 
law,  based as  it  is  on  considerations of telecommunications  policy  has  objectives 
different to, but consistent with, the objectives of  Community competition policy.  The 
Commission  cooperates as far as possible with the National Regulatory Authorities, 
and invites the National Regulatory Authorities to cooperate as far as possible between 
themselves.  Under  Community  law,  national  authorities,  including  regulatory 
authorities  and  competition  authorities,  have  a  duty  not  to  approve  a  practice  or 
agreement contrary to  Community competition law. 
10.  Community competition rules arc not sufficient to remedy the various problems in the 
telecommunications sector.  NRAs therefore have a significantly wider ambit and  a 
significant and  far-reaching  role  in  the  regulation of the  sector.  It should also  be 
noted that as a matter of Community law,  the NRAs must be  indcpcndcnt.
9 
11.  It is  also important to  note that the ONP framework  imposes certain obligations on 
national telecommunications operators that go beyond those that would normally be 
imposed  by  Article  86  EC.  NRAs  may  require  strict  standards  relating  to 
transparency, obligations to  supply and  pricing  practices. These obligations can be 
enforced by the National Regulatory Authorities, which also have jurisdiction to take 
ffi  .  . .  10 
steps to ensure e  ect1ve competitiOn  . 
12.  This Notice is written, for convenience, in  most respects as if the law was conceived 
with only one telecommunications operator controlling the only nation-wide public 
switched  telecommunications  network  in  each  Member  States.  This  will  not 
necessarily be the case: new telecommunications networks offering increasingly wide 
coverage will develop progressively.  These alternative telecommunications networks 
may ultimately be large and extensive enough to be partly or even wholly substitutable 
for the existing national networks, and this should be kept in  mind. 
13. 
8 
9 
10 
Given the Commission's responsibility for  the Community's competition policy, the 
Commission  must  serve  the  Community's  general  interest.  The  administrative 
resources at the Commission's disposal to perform its task arc necessarily limited and 
cannot be used to deal with all  the cases brought to  its attention.  The Commission 
National  Regulatory  Authority  is  a  sector  specific  national  telecommunications 
regulatory  created  by  a  Member  State  in  the  context  of the  services  directive as 
amended, and the ONP framework. 
Article 7 of the services directive (Commission Directive 90/388/EEC, referred to above 
in  footnote 3),  and  the  Commission's Communication 95/C  275/02 to  the  European 
Parliament and the Council on the status and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC 
on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ C 275, 20.10.1995, 
at  p.  9 et seq.  See also Case  C-91/94,  Thierry Tranchant and  Telephones Stores 
SARL,  Judgment of the Court of Justice, 9 November 1995,  not yet reported. 
Proposed ONP interconnection Directive cited in footnote 4,  Article 9(3). 
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11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Draft 
is therefore obliged, in  general, to take all  organisational measures necessary for the 
performance of its task and, in particular, to establish priorities 
11
• 
The Commission has therefore indicated that it  intends, in using its decision-making 
powers, to  concentrate on notifications,  complaints  and  own-initiative proceedings 
having  particular  political,  economic  or  legal  significance  for  the  Community
12
• 
Where these features arc absent in a particular case, notifications will not normally be 
dealt with by means of a formal decision, but rather a comfort letter (subject to the 
consent of the parties), and complaints should, as a rule, be handled by national courts 
or other relevant authorities.  In this context, it  should  be noted that the competition 
rules arc directly c1Tcctivc
13  so that EC competition law is enforceable in the national 
courts.  Even where other Community legislation has been respected, this does not 
remove the need to comply with the Community competition rules.
14 
Other national authorities, in particular National Regulatory Authorities acting within 
the ONP framework, have jurisdiction over certain access agreements (which must be 
notified to them).  However, notification of an agreement to an NRA docs not make 
notification of  an agreement to the Commission unnecessary.  The National Regulation 
Authorities must ensure that actions taken by them are consistent with EC competition 
law
15
,  this  duty  requires  them  to  refrain  from  action  that  would  undermine  the 
effective  protection  of  Community  law  rights  under  the  competition  rules
16
• 
Therefore, they may not approve arrangements which are contrary to the competition 
rules
17
•  [f the  national  authorities act so as to  undermine those rights, the Member 
Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission, 1992 ECR 11-2223, at paragraph 77; and Case 
T-114/92,  BEMIM v Commission, 1995 ECR  II  147. 
Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 
85  and 86  of the EEC Treaty, OJ C 39/6 (1993), at paragraph  14. 
Draft  Notice  on  cooperation  between  national  competition  authorities  and  the 
Commission, OJ  C 262/5,  10 September 1996. 
Case 127/73,  BRT v SABAM,  1974 ECR  51. 
Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed,  1989 ECR 838. 
They  must  not,  for example,  encourage or reinforce or approve  the  results of anti-
competitive behaviour:  Ahmed  Saeed,  above at footnote  14;  Case  153/93,  Federal 
Republic of Germany v Delta Schiffahrts, 1994 ECR-1  2517; Case 267/86, Van Eycke, 
1988 ECR 4769. 
Case 13/77, GB-Inno-BM/ATAB, 1977 ECR 2115, at paragraph 33: "while itis true that 
Article  86  is  directed at  undertakings,  nonetheless  it  is  also  true  that  the  Treaty 
imposes a duty on Member States not to adopt or maintain in force any measure which 
could deprive the provision of its effectiveness." 
For further duties of national authorities see Case 103/88, Frate  IIi Costanzo SpA, 1989 
ECR  1839.  . 
See Ahmed Saeed,  above at footnote 14:  "Articles 5 and 90 of the  EEC Treaty must 
be  interpreted  as  (  i  )  prohibiting  the  national  authorities  from  encouraging  the 
conclusion of  agreements on tariffs contrary to Article 85(1 ) or  Article 86 of  the Treaty, 
(continued ... ) 
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State  may  itself be  liable  in  damages  to  those  harmed  by  this action
1x.  In  addition, 
National  Regulatory  Authorities  have jurisdiction under the  ONP  directives  to  take 
steps to  ensure effective competition.
1
'
1 
16.  Access  agreements  in  principle  regulate  the  provision  of certain  services  between 
independent undertakings and  do  not  result  in  the  creation of an  autonomous entity 
which would  he  distinct from  the  parties  to  the  agreements.  Access agreements are 
thus generally outside the scope of the  Merger Regulation
111
• 
17.  Under Regulation  l i
1
,  the Commission could be seised of an issue relating to access 
agreements  by  way  of a notiJication  of an  access agreement  by  one or more of the 
parties  involved
22
,  by  way  of a complaint against  a restrictive access agreement or 
against the behaviour of a dominant company in granting or refusing access
23
, by way 
of a Commission own-initiative procedure into  such a grant or refusal, or by  way of 
a sector inquiry
14
•  In  addition, a complainant may  request that the Commission take 
interim  measures  in  circumstances  where  there  is  an  urgent  risk  of serious  and 
irreparable harm to  the complainant or to  the  public interest
25
•  It should however, be 
noted  in  cases of great  urgency  that  procedures  before  national  courts  can  usually 
result more  quickly  in  an  order to  end  the  infringements than  procedures before the 
Commission.
21
' 
17
{ ... continued) 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
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as the case may be; ( ii) precluding the approval by those authorities of  tariffs resulting 
from such agreements" 
Joined Cases  C-6  and  9/90,  Francovich,  1990-1  ECR  5357;  Joined Cases C-46/93, 
Brasserie de  Pecheur SA v Germany and  Case C-48/93,  R v Secretary of State for 
Transport ex  parte  Factortame  Ltd  and  others,  judgment of 5 March  1996,  not yet 
reported. 
For example, recital 18 of the leased line directive referred to in footnote 4 and Article 
9(3) of the draft ONP interconnection directive. 
Council Regulation No 4064/89 of 21  December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, OJ  L 395/1  (  1989). 
Council Regulation No 17  of 6 February  1962,  first Regulation implementing Articles 
85 and 86  of the Treaty,  OJ  13/204 (1962},  as amended. 
Articles 2 and 4(1) of Regulation 17. 
Article 3 of Regulation 17. 
Articles 3 and  12 of Regulation 17. 
Case 792/79R,  Camera Care v Commission, 1980 ECR  119. 
See also Case T-44/90,  La  Cinq v Commission, 1992 ECR  11-1. 
See  point  16  of  the  Notice  on  cooperation  between  national  courts  and  the 
Commission cited above in  footnote 12. 
7 Draft 
I  X.  There arc a number of areas \\·here agreements ,,·ill be subject to  both the competition 
rules and national or J:uropean sector specific regulation. most notably Internal Market 
regulation.  In  the telecommunications sector. the ONP Directives aims at establishing 
a regulatory  regime  for  access agreements.  Given the  detailed  nature of ONP rules 
and  the  fact  that  they  may  go  beyond  the  requirements of Article  86.  undertakings 
opcrnting in  the  telecommunications sector should be  ll\\'arc that compliance with the 
Community  competition  rules  docs  not  ahsol\'c  them  of their  duty  to  abide  by 
obligations imposed  in  the  ONP context. and  \'icc \'Crsa. 
2  Commission Action in  Relation to Access Agt·ccmcnts
27 
Jl).  :\cccss  agreements  taken  as  a  \\hole  arc  of great  significance.  and  it  is  therefore 
appropriate  for  the  Commission to  spell  out  as  clearly  as  possible the  Community 
legal  framc\\'ork  within  \\ hich  these  agreements  should  be  concluded.  Access 
agreements  ha\'ing  rcstricti\·c  clauses  \\'ill  in\'oh·c  issues  under  Article  85. 
Agreements \\hich in\'ol\'c dominant. or monopolist. undertakings in\'olvc Article 86 
issues:  concerns  arising  from  the  dominance  of one  or  more  of the  parties  will 
generally be of greater significance in  the context of a particular agreement than those 
under Article 85. 
20.  In  applying the competition rules. the Commission will build on the ONP framework. 
and  the  National  Rceulatorv  Authorities  acts  within  that  framework.  Where 
agreements fall  within ~\rticlc. 85( I). they  must be  notified to  the  Con11nis~t'11 if they 
arc to  benefit from  an exemption under Article 85(3).  \Vhcrc agreements arc notified. 
the  Commission intends  to  deal  \\·ith  one  or  more  notifications  by  way  of formal 
decisions.  following  appropriate publicity  in  the  Official Journal. and  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  set  out  below.  Once  the  legal  principles  have  been  clearly 
established. the Commission then proposes to deal  by  \\'ay of comfort letter with other 
notifications raising the  same issues. 
21. 
27 
2R 
29 
3.  Complaints:x 
Natural or legal  persons \\·ith  a legitimate interest may.  under certain circumstances, 
submit a complaint to  the  Commission. requesting that  the  Commission by  decision 
require that an  infringement of Article 85  or Article 86  EC  be  brought to  an  end.  A 
complainant  may  additionally  request  that  the  Commission  take  interim  measures 
where  there  is  an  urgent  risk  of serious  and  irreparable  harn/
1
•  A  prospective 
complainant has other equally or even more effective options. such as an action before 
a national court.  In this context, it should be noted that procedures before the national 
Article 2 or 4(1) of Regulation 17. 
Article 3(2) of Regulation 17. 
Camera Care and  La  Cinq,  referred to  above at footnote 25. 
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courts can  otTer  considerable advantages  !'or  individuals and  companies.  such as  in 
.  I  1o  part1cu ar · : 
national courts can deal with and award a claim for damages resulting from an 
infringement of the competition rules; 
national courts can  usually adopt  interim  measures and order the termination 
of an  infringement more quickly than  the  Commission is  able to  do; 
before national courts, it is possible to combine a claim under Community law 
will a claim under national  law; 
legal costs can he  awarded to  the successful applicant before a national  court 
Furthermore,  the  specific  national  regulatory  principles  as  harmonized  under  ONP 
principles can offer recourse both at the national and if necessary at Community level. 
3. I  lise of  1wt ional am/ ON  P jJf'Ocedure.,· 
22.  As referred to ahovc
11  the Commission will  take  into account the Community interest 
of each  case  brought  to  its  attention.  In  evaluating  the  Community  interest,  the 
Commission examines: 
23. 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
" ... the signUicance t?lt he alleged in.fi-ingement as regards I he.fimct  ioning l?lthe 
common  market,  the  prohahility  c?l  estahlishing  the  existence  c?l  the 
infringement  am/ the  scope  t?lthe  investigation  required in  order to .fu(fil. 
under the hest possihle conditions,  its task t?lensuring that Articles 85 and 86 
are complied with  ... ""
2 
Another essential element in  this evaluation is  the extent to which a national judge is 
in  a position to  provide an  ciTective remedy  for  an  infringement of Article 85  or 86. 
This may  prove difiicult,  for  example,  in  cases involving extra-territorial elements. 
Article 85( 1) and Article X6  EC produce direct effects in relations between individuals 
which  must  he  safeguarded  by  national  courts.1.1_  As  regards  actions  before  the 
National Regulatory Authority, the ONP Directive provides that such an authority has 
power to  intervene and order changes in  relation to  both the existence and content of 
access agreements.  National Regulatory Authorities must take into account. "the need 
to stimulate a compelilil•e market" and  may  impose conditions on one or more parties, 
inter alia, "to ensure ejji:cfil•e  L'ompelition"
1
•
1
• 
Notice  on  cooperation  between  national courts  and  the  Commission cited  above in 
footnote 12,  point 16. 
At paragraph  14. 
See Automec,  footnote  11  above,  paragraph 86. 
BRT v SABAM, footnote 13 above. 
Articles 9(1) and  9(3) of the  Proposed ONP interconnection Directive. 
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24.  The Commission may  itself be  seized of a dispute either pursuant to  the competition 
rules,  or  pursuant  to  an  ONP  Conciliation  Procedure.  Multiple  simultaneous 
proceedings  might  lead  to  unnecessary  duplication  of investigative  efforts  by  the 
Commission and  the  national  authorities.  Where  complaints  are  lodged  with  the 
Commission under Article 3 of Regulation  17  while there arc  related actions before 
a  relevant  national  or  European  authority  or  court,  the  Directorate-General  for 
Competition will generally not initially pursue any investigation as to the existence of 
an infringement under Article 85  or 86 of the  EC  Treaty.  This is  subject, however, 
to the  following  points. 
3. 2  Safeguarding complainant's rights 
25.  Undertakings  arc  entitled  to  effective  protection  of their  Community  law  rights
35
• 
These rights would be  undermined if national  proceedings were allowed to  lead to  an 
excessive delay  of the  Commission's action,  without a satisfactory resolution of the 
matter at  a national  level.  In  the  telecommunications sector,  innovation cycles arc 
relatively  short,  and  any  substantial  delay  in  resolving  an  access dispute  would  in 
practice be equivalent to a refusal of access, thus prejudging the proper determination 
of the case. 
26.  The Commission therefore  takes  the  view  that  an  access dispute  before  a National 
Regulatory Authority should he resolved within a reasonable period of time, normally 
speaking  not  extending  beyond  six  months  of the  matter  tirst  being  drawn  to  the 
attention  of that  authority  or  after  initiation  of ONP  procedures,  including  the 
conciliation  proccdurcs"
1
'.  This  resolution  could  take  the  form  of either  a  final 
determination of the action or another form  of relief which would safeguard the rights 
of the complainant.  If the  matter has not reached such a resolution then, prima facie, 
the rights of the parties arc not being effectively protected, and the Commission would 
in  principle, upon request by  the complainant, begin its  investigations into the case in 
accordance with  its normal  procedures, alter consultation and  in cooperation with the 
national authority  in  question. 
27. 
28. 
35 
3.3  Interim measures 
As  regards any  request for  interim measures, the existence of national  proceedings is 
relevant  to  the  question  of whether  there  is  a risk of serious and  irreparable  harm. 
Such  proceedings  should,  prima  l~tcie,  remove  the  risk  of such  harm  and  it  would 
therefore  not  be  appropriate  for  the  Commission  to  grant  interim  measures  in  the 
absence of evidence that  the  risk would  nevertheless remain. 
The availability of and  criteria  for  injunctive  relief is  an  important  factor which  the 
Commission  must  take  into  account  in  reaching  this  prima  l~1cie  conclusion.  If 
injunctive relief were not available, or if such relief was not  likely adequately to  take 
into account the complainant's rights under Community law,  the Commission would 
Case 14/83, Von Colson,  1984 ECR  1891. 
Telecommunications:  Open  network  provision  (ONP)  for  leased  lines:  Conciliation 
procedure; 94/C 214/04,  OJ  C 214/4 (1994). 
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consider that  the  national  proceedings did  not  remove  the  risk of harm,  and  would 
therefore commence its  investigation of the case. 
4.  Own-Initiative Investigation and Sector Inquiries 
29.  If it appears necessary, the  Commission will  open an own-initiative investigation. It 
can also launch a sector inquiry,  subject to  consultation of the  Advisory Committee 
of Member State competition authorities. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
37 
38 
40 
41 
5.  Fines 
The Commission may  impose  lines of up  to  I  0'%  of the  annual  worldwide  turnover 
of undertakings which intentionally or negligently breach Article 85( I) or Article 86
37
• 
Where  agreements  have  been  notified  pursuant to  Regulation  17  for  an  exemption 
under Article 85(3). no  fine  may  be  levied  by the Commission in  respect of activities 
described  in  the  notification
1
x for  the  period  following  notification.  However,  the 
Commission may  withdraw the  immunity  from  fines  by  informing the  undertakings 
concerned that,  after preliminary examination,  it  is  of the  opinion that Article 85(1) 
of the Treaty applies and  that application of Article 85(3) is  not justified
30
• 
The  ONP  interconnection  Directive  has  two  particular  provisions which  should  be 
taken into account with respect to  the  question of fines  under the  competition rules. 
First,  it  provides  that  interconnection  agreements  must  be  communicated  to  the 
relevant National Regulatory Authorities and made available to interested third parties, 
with  the  exception  of those  parts  which  deal  with  the  commercial  strategy  of the 
parties
40
•  Secondly.  it  provides that  the  National  Regulatory  Authority  must  have  a 
number  of powers  which  it  can  usc  to  influence  or  amend  the  interconnection 
agrecments
41
•  These  provisions  ensure  that  appropriate  publicity  is  given  to  the 
agreements,  and  provide  the  National  Regulatory  Authority  with  the  opportunity  to 
take steps, where appropriate, to  ensure effective competition on  the  market. 
Where an agreement has been notified to a National Regulatory Authority, but has not 
been  notified  to  the  Commission,  the  Commission does  not  consider  it  would  be 
generally  appropriate  as  a  matter  of policy  to  impose  a  fine  in  respect  of the 
agreement, even if the agreement ultimately proves to contain conditions in breach of 
Article 85.  A fine would, however, be appropriate in some cases, for example where: 
Article 15(2) of Regulation 17. 
Article 15(5) of Regulation 17. 
Article 15(6) of Regulation 17. 
Article 6(c) of the Proposed ONP interconnection Directive. 
Inter alia, at Article 9 of the  Proposed ONP interconnection Directive. 
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a.  the  agreement  proves to  contain  provisions in  breach of Article 86; and I or 
b.  the  breach of Article 85  is  particularly serious. 
The size of the  line will depend on  the  gravity and duration of the infringement. 
Notification to  the  NR/\ is  not a substitute for  a notification to  the Commission and 
does  not  limit  the  possibility  for  interested  parties  to  submit  a  complaint  to  the 
Commission,  or  for  the  Commission  to  begin  an  own-initiative  investigation  into 
access  agreements.  Nor  docs  such  notification  I  imit  the  rights  of a  party  to  seck 
damages before a national court  for  harm caused by  anti-competitive agrecments
42
• 
See footnote 18 above. 
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Part II:  Relevant Markets 
34.  In the course of investigating cases within the  framework set out in  Part I above, the 
Commission will  base  itself on  the  following  approach to  the  definition of relevant 
markets in  this sector. 
35.  Firms  arc  subject  to  three  mam  sources  of  competitive  constraints;  demand 
substitutability,  supply  substitutability  and  potential  competition,  with  the  first 
constituting the most immediate and eiTective disciplinary force on  the suppliers of a 
given  product or service.  Demand  substitutability is  therefore the  main  tool  used to 
define  the  relevant  product  market  on  which  restrictions  of competition  for  the 
purposes of Articles SS( I)  and  SC>  can  be  identified. 
36.  Supply  substitutability is  generally  not  used  to  dclinc relevant markets.  In  practice 
it  cannot  be  clearly  distinguished  from  potential  competition.  Supply  side 
substitutability  and  potential  competition  arc  used  for  the  purpose  of determining 
whether  the  undertaking  has  a  dominant  position  or  whether  the  restriction  of 
competition  is  signilicant  within  the  meaning  of Article  85,  or  whether  there  is 
elimination of competition. 
37.  In assessing relevant markets it  is  necessary to  look at developments in the market in 
the short term. 
1.  Relevant product marl<et 
38.  Section 6 of Form  ;\/B dclincs the  relevant  product  market as  follows: 
"A  relevant product  market  comprises all those products  and I  or services 
which are regarded as interclwngeahle or suhstitutahle hy the consumer,  hy 
reason (?lthe products' clwracteristics,  their prices and their intended use". 
39.  The ending of the  legal  monopolies in  the  telecommunications sector, whereby third 
parties can provide services to end-users, will  lead to the emergence of a second type 
of market,  related  to  the  market for  provision of services, that of access to  facilities 
which arc currently necessary to provide these services.  In this sector, interconnection 
to  the  public  switched  telecommunications  network  would  be  a typical  example  of 
such access.  Without  inten:onnection,  it  will  not  he  commercially possible for  third 
parties to  provide,  for  example, comprehensive voice telephony services. 
40.  It is clear, therefore, that  in  the telecommunications sector there arc at  least two types 
of relevant product markets to  consider - that of a service to  be  provided to end users 
and  that  of access to  those  ll!Cilities  necessary  to  provide  that  service  to  end  users 
(information, physical  network, etc.).  In  the context of any  particular case, it  will  be 
necessary to  define the  relevant access and  services markets, such as  interconnection 
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to  the  public  telecommunications network,  and  provision of public  voice  telephony 
services, respectively. 
41.  When  appropriate,  the  Commission will  usc  the  test of a relevant  market  which  is 
made  by  asking whether,  if all  the  suppliers of the  services in  question raised their 
prices  by  5-10
1%,  their collective profits would  rise.  According to  this test,  if their 
profits would rise. the  market considered is a separate relevant market. 
42.  The Commission considers that the principles under competition law governing these 
markets remain  the  same regardless of the  particular market  in  question.  Given  the 
pace of technological  changc  in  this  sec..:tor,  any  attempt  to  define particular product 
markets in this Notice would run the risk of rapidly becoming inaccurate or irrelevant. 
The  definition  of particular  product  markets  is  best  done  in  the  light of a detailed 
examination of an  individual  case. 
1.1.  Set"\'h:es  market. 
43.  This can  be  broadly defined as  the provision of any telecommunications service to  a 
user.  Different telecommunications services will  be  considered substitutable if they 
show a sufficient degree of interchangeability for the end-user, which would mean that 
effective competition can take place between the different providers of these services. 
44. 
45. 
1.2  Access  to j{tcilities 
For a service provider to  provide services to  end-users it  will  often require access to 
one or more (upstream or downstream)  l~tcilities.  For example, to  deliver physically 
the  service  to  end-users.  it  needs  access  to  the  termination  points  of  the 
telecommunications network to  which these end-users arc connected.  This access can 
be  achieved  at  the  physical  level  through  dedicated  or  shared  local  infrastructure, 
either  self provided  or  leased  from  a  local  infrastructure  provider.  It can  also  be 
achieved  either  through  a  service  provider  who  already  has  these  end-users  as 
subscribers,  or  through  an  interconnection  provider  who  has  access  directly  or 
indirectly to  the  relevant termination points. 
In  addition  to  physical access, a service provider may  need  access to  other facilities 
to  enable it  to  market  its  service to  end  users:  for example, a service provider must 
be  able  to  make  end  users  aware  of its  services.  Where,  as  is  often  the  case,  for 
example.  with  directory  information,  the  l~tcility  can  only  be  obtained  from  the 
telecommunications operator. similar concerns arise as  with  physical access issues. 
In  many cascs. the Commission will  be concerned with  physical access issues, where 
what is necessary is interconnection to the net work orthe telecommunications operator~ 
1
• 
Interconnection is defined in  Directive 96/19/EC as: 
"  ...  the physical and logical/inking of the telecommunications facilities of  organisations 
providing telecommunications networks and I or telecommunications services, in order 
to  allow the users of one organisation to  communicate with the users of the same or 
another organisation or to  access services provided by third organisations." 
(continued ... ) 
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47.  Some  incumbent  telecommunications  operators  may  be  tempted  to  resist  providing 
access to  third party service providers or other network operators, particularly in areas 
where  the  proposed  service  will  be  in  competition  with  a service  provided  by  the 
telecommunications  operator  itself.  This  resistance  will  orten  manifest  itself as  a 
reluctance  to  allow access  or  a willingness  to  allow  it  only  under disadvantageous 
conditions.  It is  the  role  of the  competition  rules  to  ensure that  these  prospective 
access markets arc allowed to develop, and that incumbent operators arc not permitted 
to  use their control over access to  stifle developments on  the services markets. 
It should  be  stressed  that  in  the  telecommunications  sector,  liberalisation  can  be 
expected to lead to the development of new, alternative networks which will ultimately 
have  an  · impact  on  access  market  dcJinition  involving  the  incumbent 
telecommunications operator. 
2.  Relevant geographic marl{et 
48.  Relevant geographic markets arc dctincd  in  Form  A/8 as  follows: 
"The relevant geographic market mmpri.\'C'S the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are ini'Oh•ed in the  SUfJJJ~\' and demand l?f'Jn·oducts or ,\'('l'l'iCL'S,  in 
which the conditions l?/' COIIIJJetition  are  Sl!/fic.:ient~v homogeneous amlll'hich 
can  he  distinguished .fi'om  neighhouring  areas  hecau.\·e  the  conditions  l?t' 
competition are aJJpreciahly d(//erent in those areas." 
49.  As  regards  the  provision  of telecommunication  services  and  access  markets,  the 
relevant  geographic  market  will  be  the  area  in  which  the  objective  conditions  of 
competition applying to  service providers arc  similar.  It will  therefore be  necessary 
to examine the possibility for these service providers to access an end-user in any part 
of this  area,  under  equivalent  and  economically  viable  conditions.  Regulatory 
conditions such as the terms of licences, and any exclusive or special rights owned by 
competing local access providers arc  particularly relevant 
44
• 
43
{ ... continued) 
44 
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In the full liberalization Directive and ONP Directives, telecommunications services are 
defined as: 
"services, whose provision consists wholly or partly in the transmission and I or routing 
of signals on  a telecommunications network." 
It therefore includes the transmission of broadcasting signals and CATV networks. 
A telecommunications network is itself defined as: 
"  ...  the transmission equipment and,  where applicable, switching equipment and other 
resources which permit the conveyance of  signals between defined termination points 
by wire,  by radio,  by optical or by other electromagnetic means". 
Eurotunnel, OJ  L 354/66 (1994). 
15 Draft 
Part Ill:  Principles 
50.  The Commission will  apply  the  following  principles in  cases before  it. 
51.  The Commission has  recognised that: 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
45 
4G 
47 
"Articles  85  and 86  ...  constitute  law  in .fhrce  and el!lorceahfe  throughout  the 
Community.  Cm!flicts  should  not  arise  with  other  Community  rules  because 
Commznzity  law  fimns  u  coherent  regulatrny  fi·mllell'ork...  it  is  obvious  that 
( 'omnumity acts adopted in the tclecommwzications sector arc to he interpreted in a 
ll'ay consistent with competition rules. so as to ensure the hest possihle implementation 
(~loll aspects (~ltlze Community telecoi!IJJIIIIIicalions policy  ...  7/zis applies, inter alia, 
to the relationship he/ween competition rules aJJplicahle to undertakings am/ the ONP 
I 
..  4, 
ru es. 
Thus,  competition  rules  continue  to  apply  in  circumstances  where  other  Treaty 
provisions or secondary legislation arc applicable.  In the context of access agreements 
the Internal  Market and competition provisions of Community law arc both important 
and mutually reinforcing for the proper runctioning or the sector.  Thcrcrorc in making 
an  assessment under the  competition rules,  the  Commission will  seek  to  build as  l~u· 
as  possible on  the  principles established  in  the  harmonization  legislation.  It should 
also be  borne  in  mind  that a number or the  competition law  principles set out below 
arc  also  covered  by  specific  rules  in  the  context  of the  ONP  framework.  Proper 
application  of these  rules  should  often  avoid  the  need  for  the  application  of the 
competition rules. 
As  regards  the  telecommunications  sector,  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  cost of 
universal  service  obligations.  Article  90(2)  EC  may  justify  exceptions  to  the 
principles of Articles 85  and  86  EC.  The details of universal service obligations arc 
a regulatory matter.  The field of application of Article 90(2) has been specified in the 
Article 90 Directives in the telecommunications sector, and the Commission will apply 
the  competition rules  in  this context. 
Articles 85  and  8(>  FC apply  in  the  normal  manner to  agreements or practices which 
have  been  approved  or  authorised  by  a  national  authorit/
1
',  or  where  the  national 
authority has required the  inclusion of terms in  an  agreement at the  request of one or 
more of the  parties involved. 
llowcvcr, if a national regulatory authority were to require terms which were contrary 
to  the  competition  rules,  the  undertakings  involved  would  in  practice  not  be  lined, 
although the  Member State itself would  be  in  breach of /\rticlcs 3(g) and  5 EC
47  and 
thcrcfi.)rc subject to challenge by the Commission under Article 169 EC.  Additionally, 
Guidelines on the application of the competition rules in the telecommunications sector, 
see point 3 above,  at paragraphs 15 and  16. 
Commission Decision, BNIC/AROW, 82/896/EEC, OJ  L 379/1  (1982). 
See footnote 15 above. 
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if an  undertaking having special or exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90, 
or a state-owned undertaking,  were  required  or authorised  by  a national  regulator to 
engage in behaviour constituting an abuse of its dominant position, the Member State 
would also be  in  breach of Article 90( I)  and  the  Commission could adopt a decision 
requiring termination of the  infraction
4x. 
56.  National  Regulatory  Authorities  may  require  strict  standards  of  transparency, 
obligations to  supply and  pricing practices on  the  market,  particularly where this  is 
necessary in  the early stages of liberalization.  When appropriate, legislation such as 
the  ONP  framework  will  be  used  as  an  aid  in  the  interpretation of the  competition 
rulcs
4
''.  Given  the  duty  resting  on  National  Regulatory  Authorities  to  ensure  that 
effective  competition  is  possible,  application  of the  competition  rules  is  likewise 
required  for  an  appropriate  interpretation  of the  ONP  principles.  It should  also  be 
noted that many  of the  issues set out  below arc also covered  by  rules  under the  Full 
Competition  Directive  and  the  existing  and  proposed  ONP,  licensing  and  data 
protection  Directives:  eiTectivc  enforcement  of this  regulatory  framework  should 
prevent many  of the  competition issues set out below  from  arising. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
4X 
1.  Dominance (Article 8(,) 
In  order for  an  undertaking  to  provide  services  in  the  telecommunications services 
market,  it  will  need  to  obtain  access  to  various  facilities.  For  the  provision  of 
telecommunications  services,  for  example.  interconnection  to  the  public  switched 
telecommunications network  will  usually  be  necessary.  Access to  this network will 
almost always be in the hands of  a dominant telecommunications operator.  As regards 
access agreements, dominance stemming  from  control  on  l~tcilitics will  be  the  most 
relevant to  the  Commission's appraisal. 
Whether  or  not  a  company  is  dominant  docs  not  depend  only  on  the  legal  rights 
granted to  that company.  The mere ending of legal  monopolies docs not  put an  end 
to  dominance.  Indeed, notwithstanding the liberalization Directives, the development 
of  effective competition from alternative network providers with adequate capacity and 
geographic reach will  take  time. 
In  the  telecommunications  sector,  the  concept of "essential  facilities"  will  in  many 
cases be of direct relevance in determining the duties of dominant telecommunications 
operators.  The phrase essential facility  is  used  to  describe a  l~tcility or infrastructure 
Joined Cases C-48 and  66/90,  Netherlands and  others v Commission,  1992 ECR  1-
565. 
See Ahmed  Saeed,  footnote  14  above,  where  internal market legislation relating to 
pricing was used as an  aid in determining what level of prices should be  regarded as 
unfa.ir for the purposes of Article 86. 
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which is essential for reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their 
business, and  which cannot he  replicated  by  any  reasonable means.
50 
A company controlling the access to  an  essential  f~1cility enjoys a dominant position 
within  the  meaning  of Article  86.  Conversely, a company  may  enjoy  a dominant 
position pursuant to  Article 86  without controlling an  essential  f~1cility. 
The  following  f~1cilities could at  present he  expected to  constitute essential facilities 
in  the  telecommunications  sector:  for  example,  the  public  telecommunications 
networks  for  voice  ami/or  data  services,  leased  circuit  or  and  related  network 
terminating equipment, basic data regarding subscribers to the public voice telephony 
service, numbering schemes and  other customer or technical  information. 
I./.  Sen·ices market 
60.  One of the  f~1ctors used to  measure the  market power of an  undertaking arc the sales 
attributable to  that undertaking, expressed as a percentage of total sales in the market 
for  substitutable services  in  the  relevant  geographic  area.  As  regards  the  services 
market, the  Commission will  assess, inter alia, the turnover generated by  the sale of 
substitutable services, excluding the sale or internal usage of interconnection services 
and  the  sale or  internal  usage of local  infrastructure
51
,  taking  into  consideration the 
competitive conditions and  the  structure of supply and  demand on  the  market. 
50 
51 
1.2  Access /o /itcililies 
The  concept  of "access"  as  referred  to  above  in  point  45  can  relate  to  a  range  of 
situations, including the availability of leased lines enabling a service provider to build 
up  its  own  network.  and  interconnection  problem  in  the  strict  sense,  i.e. 
interconnecting two telecommunication networks. e.g.  mobile and  fixed.  In relation to 
access,  incumbent  operators  often  occupy  a  monopoly  position.  and  even  in  areas 
where  liberalization  of the  legal  framework  has  begun,  it  is  probable  that  the 
incumbent  will  remain  dominant  in  the  future.  The  incumbent  operator,  which 
controls the  f~Icilities, is  often also the  largest service provider, and they  have  in  the 
past not needed to distinguish between the conveyance of  telecommunications services 
and  the  provision of these  services to  end-users.  Today, an  operator who  is  also a 
service provider docs not require its downstream operating ann to pay for access, and 
therefore it  is  not  easy  to  calculate the  revenue  to  be  allocated  to  the  facility.  In  a 
See also the definition included in the "Additional commitment on  regulatory principles 
by  the European Communities and their Member States "used by  the Group on  basic 
telecommunications in the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations 
"Essential facilities mean facilities of a public telecommunications transport network and 
service that 
(a)  are  exclusively or predominantly  provided  by  a  single or limited number of 
suppliers;  and 
(b)  cannot feasibly be  economically or technically substituted in order to provide 
a service." 
Case 6/72 Continental Can,  1973 ECR 215. 
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case where an operator is providing both access and services it is necessary to separate 
so far as possible the revenues for the two  markets before using revenues as the basis 
for the calculation of the company's share of whichever market is  involved.  Article 
8(2) of the proposed Interconnection Directive should be  helpful  in  this context as it 
calls for  separate accounting for "activities related to  interconnection - covering both 
interconnection services provided internally and  interconnection services provided to 
others - and other activities". 
62.  The economic  significance of obtaining access also depends on  the  coverage of the 
network  with  which  interconnection  is  sought.  Therefore,  in  addition  to  using 
turnover ligures, the  Commission will.  where this  is  possible, also  take  into  account 
the  number  or customers  who  have  subscribed  to  services  comparable  with  those 
which the service provider requesting access intends to provide.  Accordingly, market 
power for  a given  undertaking will  be  measured partly  by  the number of subscribers 
who arc  connected  to  termination points of the  telecommunications network of that 
undertaking expressed as  a percentage of the  total  number of subscribers connected 
to  termination points in  the  relevant geographic area. 
Supply-side substitutability 
63.  As  stated  above  (sec  point  37),  supply-side  substitutability  is  also  relevant  to  the 
question  of dominance.  A  market  share  of over  50%
52  is  usually  sufficient  to 
demonstrate dominance  although  other  l~1ctors will  be  examined.  For  example,  the 
Commission will  examine  the  existence of other  network  providers,  if any,  in  the 
relevant  geographic  area  to  determine  whether  such  alternative  infrastructures  arc 
sufliciently dense to  provide competition to  the  incumbent's network  and  the  extent 
to  which  it  would  he  possible for  new access providers to  enter the  market. 
64. 
65. 
Other relevant  factors 
In  addition  to  market  share  data,  and  supply-side  substitutability,  in  determining 
whether  an  operator  is  dominant  the  Commission  will  also  examine  whether  the 
operator has privileged access to  facilities which cannot be duplicated, either for legal 
reasons or because it  would cost too  much. 
As competing access providers appear and challenge the dominance of the incumbent, 
the scope of the rights they receive from  Member States' authorities, and notably their 
territorial  reach,  will  play  an  important  part  in  the  determination of market  power. 
The Commission will  closely follow  market evolution in  relation  to  these issues and 
It should be noted in this context that under the ONP framework an organisation may 
be  notified  as  having  significant market  power.  The  determination  of whether  an 
organisation does or does not have significant market power depends on a number of 
factors.  but  the  starting  presumption is that an  organisation with a market share  of 
more than  25%  will normally be  considered  to  have  significant market power.  The 
Commission will take account of whether an  undertaking has been notified as  having 
significant market power  under the ONP rules in its appraisal under the competition 
rules. 
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will take account of any altered market conditions in  its assessment of access issues 
under the competition rules. 
1.3  Joint dominance 
66.  The wording of Article 86 makes it clear that the Article applies when more than one 
company shares a dominant position.  The circumstances in which a joint dominant 
position exists, and in which it  is abused, have not yet been fully clarified by the case 
law of the Community Courts or the practice of the Commission, and the law is still 
developing. 
67.  The words of Article 86 ("abuse by one or more undertakings") describe something 
different from the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements or concerted practices 
in  Article  85.  To  hold  otherwise  would  be  contrary  to  the  usual  principles  of 
interpretation  of the  Treaty,  and  would  render  the  words  pointless  and  without 
practical effect.  This docs not, however, exclude the parallel application of Articles 
85  and  86  to  the  same  agreement  or  practice,  which  has  been  upheld  by  the 
Commission and the Court in a number of cascs
53
, nor is there anything to prevent the 
Commission from  taking action only under one of the provisions, when both apply. 
68.  Two companies, each dominant in a separate national market, arc not the same as two 
jointly  dominant  companies.  National  public  voice  telephony  telecommunications 
operators arc  not  likely  to  become jointly dominant  until  alter liberalization  in  the 
Community.  ror two or more companies to he in a joint dominant position, they must 
together have substantially the same position vis-<.1-vis their customers and competitors 
as a single company has if it  is in a dominant position.  With specific reference to the 
telecommunications  sector,  joint  dominance  could  be  attained  by  two 
telecommunications infrastructure operators covering the same geographic market. 
69.  In addition, for two or more companies to he jointly dominant it is necessary, but not 
sufficient,  for  there  to  be  no  effective  competition  between the  companies on the 
relevant market.  This lack of competition may in practice be due to the fact that the 
companies have links such as agreements for cooperation, interconnection or roaming 
agreements.  The Commission docs not, however, consider that either economic theory 
or Community law implies that such links arc legally necessary for a joint dominant 
position  to  exist
5 ~.  It  is  a  sufficient  economic  link  if  there  is  the  kind  of 
interdependence which often comes about in  oligopolistic situations.  There docs not 
seem to  he  any  reason  in  law or in  economic theory  to  require any other economic 
link  between  those companies.  This having  been said,  in  practice such  links  will 
olten  exist  in  the  telecommunications  sector  where  national  telecommunication 
operators  nearly  inevitably  have links of various kinds with one another. 
70. 
53 
54 
To take as an example  access to  the  local  loop,  in  some Member States this could 
well  be  controlled  in  the  ncar  future  by  two  operators  - the  incumbent 
Case 85/76 Hoffmann La  Roche,  1979 ECR 461, 
Racal Decca,  Commission Decision of 21  December 1988, OJ  L 43/27 (1989). 
Nestle I Perrier, Commission Decision of 22  July 1992, OJ  L 356/1  (1992). 
\ \dr-cons. wpd  20 Draft 
telecommunications operator and  a  cable  operator.  In  order to  provide  particular 
services  to  consumers,  access  to  the  local  loop  of either  the  telecommunications 
operator or the cable television operator is necessary.  Depending on the circumstances 
of the case and in particular on the relationship between them, neither operator may 
hold  a  dominant  position:  together,  however,  they  may  hold a  joint monopoly of 
access to these facilities. 
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2.  Abuses of Dominance 
2./  Rejit.w!to Rranl access to essentia/.fi.tcilities and application of 
W?/i.t!'Ol!Nthle  terms 
71.  A refusal to  give access may  be prohibited under Article 86  if the refusal is  made by 
a  company  which  is  dominant  because  of its  control  of facilities  ,  as  incumbent 
telecommunications operators  wi II  usually  be  for  the  foreseeable  future.  A refusal 
may  have: 
"the  cf/ccl  of' hindaing the  nwintmunce  of' tile  degree  of' competition  still 
existing in the morket or the  '!fi'OI\'Ih  o(llwt comuetition"''. 
A  refusal  will  only  be  abusive  if it  affects  competition.  Service  markets  in  the 
telecommunications sector will  initially have few competitive players and refusals will 
therefore generally affect competition on  those markets.  ln  all  cases of refusal, any 
justification will  be  closely examined  to  determine whether it  is  objective. 
72.  Broadly there arc three  relevant scenarios: 
73. 
74. 
a.  a  refusal to  grant access for  the  purposes of a service where  another operator 
has  been  given  access  by  the  access  provider  to  operate  on  that  services 
market: 
b.  a refusal to  grant access for  the  purposes of a service where no other operator 
has  been  given  access  by  the  access  provider  to  operate  on  that  services 
market: 
c.  a withdrawal of supply of access  from  an  existing customer. 
As  to  the  first  of the  above  scenarios,  it  is  clear  that  a  refusal  to  supply  a  new 
customer in  circumstances where a dominant facilities owner is already supplying one 
or  more  customers  operating  in  the  same  downstream  market  would  constitute 
discriminatory treatment which,  if it  would  restrict competition on  that  downstream 
market, would be an abuse.  Where network operators offer the same, or similar, retail 
services as  the  party  requesting  access,  they  may  have  both  the  incentive  and  the 
opportunity  to  restrict  competition  and  abuse  their  dominant  position  in  this  way. 
There  may,  of course,  be  justifications  for  such  refusal  - for  example,  vis-a-vis 
applicants which  represent  a potential  credit  risk.  In  the  absence of any  objective 
justifications. a refusal  would  usually  be  an  abuse  of the  dominant  position  on  the 
access market. 
In  general terms. the dominant company's duty  is to  provide access in  such a way that 
the  goods and  services offered  to  downstream companies arc available on  terms  no 
Case 85/76 Hoffmann La  Roche,  1979 ECR 461. 
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less  favourable  than  those  given  to  other  parties,  including  its  own corresponding 
downstream operations. 
As to the second or the above situations. the question arises as to whether the access 
provider should he obliged to contract with the service provider in  order to  allow the 
service provider to operate on a new service market.  Where capacity constraints arc 
not an issue and where the company refusing to  provide access to  its facility has not 
provided access to that ntcility, either to its downstream arm or to any other company 
operating on that services market, then it is not clear what other objective justification 
there could he. 
If there were no commercially feasible alternatives to the access being requested, then 
unless access is granted, the  party requesting access would not he able to operate on 
the service market.  Refusal in  this case would therefore limit the development of  new 
markets, or new products on those markets. contrary to Article 86(b  ).  In the transport 
ticld
5 ~>,  the Commission ruled that a  firm  controlling an essential facility  must give 
access  in  certain  circumstances~
7 •  The  same  principles  apply  to  the 
telecommunications sector. 
The principle obliging dominant companies to  contract in  certain circumstances will 
often he relevant in  the telecommunications sector.  Currently, there are monopolies 
or  virtual  monopolies  in  the  provision of network  inlhtstructure  for  most tclecom 
services in the EU.  Even where restrictions have already been, or will soon he, lifted, 
competition  in  downstream  markets will  continue to  depend  upon  the  pricing and 
conditions of access to  upstream  network  services that  will  only  gradually  rellect 
competitive  market  forces.  Given  the  pace  of  technological  change  in  the 
telecommunications sector, it is possible to envisage situations where companies would 
seek to offer new products or services which arc not in competition with products or 
services already oftcred by the dominant access operator, hut for which this operator 
is reluctant to provide access. 
Commission decision, Sea Containers v Stena Sealink, 94/19/EC,  OJ  L  15/8 (1994); 
Commission decision, Re  Access to  Facilities of Port Rodby,  94/119/EC, OJ  L55/52 
(1994) 
See also (among others): 
Judgments of the Court -
Cases 6 and 7173,  Commercial Solvents v.  Commission, 1974 ECR 223; 
Case 311/84, Telemarketing, 1985 ECR 3261; 
Case C-18/88 RTT v.  GB-Inno,  1991  ECR  1-5941; 
Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Teleorassi, 1991  ECR 1-2925; 
Cases T-69, T-70 and T-76/89,  RTE,  BBC and ITP v.  Commission,  1991  ECR  11-485, 
535,  575; 
Case C-271/90,  Spain v Commission, 1992 ECR 1-5833; 
Cases C-241  and 242/91P, RTE and ITP Ltd v Commission (Magill), 1995 ECR 1-743 
Commission Decisions -
76/185/EEC- National Carbonizing Company, OJ L 35/6 (1976); 
88/589/EEC- London European- Sabena,  OJ  L 317/47 (1988); 
92/213/EEC- British Midland v.  Aer Lingus, OJ  L 96/34 (1992); 
B&  I v.  Sealink, (1992) 5 CMLR 255;  EC  Bulletin, No 6- 1992,  point 1.3.30. 
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78.  The  Commission must  ensure  that  the  control  over  l~tcilitics enjoyed  by  incumbent 
operators is not used to  hamper the development of a competitive telecommunications 
environment.  A company  which  is  dominant on  a market  for  services and which 
commits an  abuse contrary  to  Article  g(,  on  that market may  be  required,  in  order to 
put an  end to  the abuse, to  supply access to  its facility  to  one or more competitors on 
that  market.  In  particular,  a  company  may  abuse  its  dominant  position  if by  its 
actions it  prevents the emergence of a new  product or service. 
79.  The  starting  point  for  the  Commission's analysis  will  he  the  idcntilication  of an 
existing  or  potential  market  for  which  access  is  being  requested.  In  order  to 
determine whether access should be ordered under the competition rules, account will 
be  taken of a breach  by  the  dominant company of its  duty  not  to  discriminate (sec 
below) or of the  following clements, taken  cumulatively: 
d. 
c. 
a.  access to  the  bcility in  question is  generally essential  in  order lor companies 
to  compete on  that  related  market'x; 
b. 
c. 
The key  issue here  is  thercli.Hc  what  is essential.  It will  not  be  sunicient that 
the  position of the company requesting access would be  more advantageous if 
access were granted - but refusal of access must lead  to  the proposed activities 
being made either impossible or  seriously and  unavoidably  uneconomic. 
Although,  li.H  example, alternative infrastructure may  as  from  I July  1996 be 
used for  liberalised services, it  will  be  some time before this is  in  many cases 
a  satisfactory  alternative  to  the  litcilitics  of the  incumbent  operator.  Such 
alternative infrastructure docs not  at  present offer the same dense geographic 
coverage as  that of the  incumbent telecommunications operator's network. 
there  is  suflicient capacity available to  provide access. 
the  litcility  owner  litils  to  satisfy demand  on  an  existing service  or  product 
market,  blocks  the  emergence  of a  potential  new  service  or  product,  or 
impedes competition on  an  existing or potential service or product market; 
the company seeking access is pn:pared to pay the reasonable and non-discriminatory 
price and  wi II  otherwise in  all  respects accept  non-discriminatory access terms and 
conditions. 
there  is  no  objective .iustilication  li.>r  refusing to  provide access. 
Community law protects competition and  not competitors,  and  therefore it would be 
insufficient to demonstrate that one competitor needed access to a facility in order to 
compete in the downstream market.  It would be necessary to demonstrate that access 
is  necessary  for  all  except exceptional competitors in  order for  access to  be  made 
compulsory. 
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Relevant  justilications  in  this  context  could  include  an  overriding  diniculty  of 
providing access to  the  requesting company. or the  need  for  a facility  owner which 
has undertaken investment aimed at  the introduction of a new product or service to 
have  sufficient time  and  opportunity  to  use  the  facility  in  order to  place that new 
product or service on  the  market.  However, although any justification will have to 
be  examined  carefully on a case-by-case basis.  It is  particularly  important in the 
telecommunications  sector  that  the  benefits  to  end-users  which  will  arise  from  a 
competitive  environment  arc  not  undermined  by  the  actions  of the  former  state 
monopolists in  preventing competition from  emerging and developing. 
In  determining whether an  infringement of Article  X6  has been committed, account will  be 
taken  both of the  1~1ctual situation  in  that and other geographic areas, and, where  relevant 
the relationship between the access requested and  the technical conliguration of the facility. 
80.  The question of objective justilication will  require  particularly close analysis in  this area. 
In addition to determining whether dirticultics cited in any particular case arc serious enough 
to justify the refusal to grant access. the  relevant authorities must also decide whether these 
dil'licultics arc sunicicnt to  outweigh the  damage done  to  competition ir access is  refused 
or  made more diflicult and  the  downstream service markets arc thus  limited. 
81.  Three  important  elements  relating  to  access  which  could  be  manipulated  by  the  access 
provider in  order,  in  effect, to  refuse to  provide access are timing, technical configuration 
and price. 
82.  Dominant  telecommunications  operators  have  a  duty  to  deal  with  requests  for  access 
efficiently:  undue  and  unexplained  delays  in  responding  to  a  request  for  access  may 
constitute  an  abuse.  In  particular,  however,  the  Commission will  seck  to  compare  the 
response to  a request for  access with: 
a.  the  usual  time  frame  and  conditions applicable  when  the  responding  party  grants 
access to  its  lacilities to  its own  subsidiary or opcmting branch; 
h.  responses to  requests  l'or  access to  similar facilities  in  other Member States; 
c.  the  explanations given  for  any  delay  in  dealing with  requests for  access. 
R3.  Issues of technical  conliguration will  similarly  he  closely examined  in  order to  determine 
whether they  arc genuine.  In  principle, competition rules require that the  party requesting 
access must be  granted access at  the  most suitable point  for  the  requesting party,  provided 
that  this  point  is  technically  lcasihlc  l()r  the  access  provider.  Questions  of technical 
feasibility may be objective justilications for refusing to supply- for example, the traffic for 
which access is  sought must  satisfy the  relevant technical standards for  the 
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infrastructure - or questions of capacity restraints, where questions of rationing mav 
0  '')  •  ansc·  . 
R4.  Excessive pricing for  access, as well  as  being abusive in  itse\('
11
,  may  also amount to 
an  eiTcctivc refusal to  grant access. 
R5.  There  arc  a  number  of clements  of these  tests  which  require  careful  assessment. 
Pricing  questions  in  the  telecommunications  sector  will  be  facilitated  by  the 
obligations un  ONP Directives to  have transparent cost-accounting systems. 
86.  As  to  the  third  of the  situations  referred  to  in  point  72  above,  some  previous 
Commission decisions and  the  case law of the  Court have  been  concerned with  the 
withdrawal  of supply  from  downstream  competitors  (the  third  case,  above).  In 
Commercial Solvents, the  Court held  that: 
.. an undertaking 1rhich has a dominant position on the nwrket in rm1· nwtcrials 
and which.  H'ith  the ohject ol  resen•ing such /"(/11'  nwterial jhr momt/itcturing 
its  011'11  derivath·cs,  re/itses  to  SllfJfJ~I'  a  customer,  11·hich  is  itself'  a 
lllmwj(tcturer  (~l  these  derimth·es,  and  therej(JI'e  risks  eliminating  all 
competition  on  the  JWI"t  (?/this  customer,  is  ahusing  its  dominant  position 
H'ithin  the meaning of'Article 8o.  oolol 
87.  Although this  case dealt  \\ith the  withdrm\·al  of a product,  there  is  no  diiTerencc  in 
principle between this case and  the  withdrawal of access.  The unilateral termination 
of access agreements raises substantially similar issues to  those examined  in  relation 
to  refusals.  Withdrawal of access from an existing customer will  usually be abusive. 
Again,  objective  reasons  may  be  provided  to  justil)'  the  termination.  Any  such 
reasons must  be  proportionate to  the effects on competition of the  withdrawal. 
7  7  ( Jther jimns of' ahuse 
88.  Refusals to  provide access arc only one form  of possible abuse in  this area.  Abuses 
may  also arise  in  the  context of access having  been  granted.  An  abuse may  occur 
inter alia where the operator is  behaving in  a discriminatory manner or the operator's 
actions otherwise  limit  markets  or  technical  development.  The  following  arc  non-
exhaustive examples of abuses \Vhich  can take  place. 
89. 
50 
GO 
G1 
62 
Nct\mrk configuration 
Network  configuration  by  a  dominant  network  operator  which  makes  access 
objectively more difficult  for  service  pn)\'idcrs
1
'c  could constitute an  abuse unless  it 
As noted above at  paragraph 80. 
See paragraph 91  below. 
Case 6 and  7/73,  Commercial Solvents,  197  4 ECR 223. 
ie to use the network to reach  their own customers 
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were objectively justifiable.  One objective justification would  be  where the network 
configuration improves the  ef'ficiency or the  network generally. 
This  is  of particular concern  where  it  involves  the  tying  of services for  which  the 
telecommunications  operator  is  dominant  with  those  for  which  it  is  exposed  to 
competition(•J.  Where the vertically integrated dominant network operator obliges the 
party  requesting  access  to  purchase  one  or  more  services
64  without  adequate 
justifications, this  may  exclude rivals or the  dominant access provider from  offering 
these elements of the package independently.  This requirement could thus constitute 
an  abuse under Article  8(). 
This is also dealt with under the  ONP framework:  see Art 7(4) of the  Interconnection 
Directive,  Art  12(4)  of  the  voice  telephony  Directive  and  Annex  II  of  the  ONP 
Framework Directive. 
ie  including  those  which  are  superfluous  to  the  latter,  or  indeed  those  which  may 
constitute services the access requester itself would like to  provide for its customers 
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Pricing 
91.  Pricing  problems  in  connection  with  access  for  service  providers  to  a  dominant 
operator's (essential)  l~1cilities will  ollen revolve around excessively high prices
1
'
5
:  in 
the absence of another viable alternative to the  l~1cility to which access is being sought 
by service providers, the dominant or monopolistic operator may he inclined to charge 
exceSSIVe  pnces. 
92. 
65 
66 
67 
Problem  of unfairly  low  prices  could  arise  in  the  context  of competition  between 
different telecommunications infrastructure networks, where a dominant operator may 
tend  to  charge unfairly  low  prices  for  access in  order to  eliminate competition from 
other (emerging) infrastructure providers,  in  violation of Article 86(a).  In  general a 
price  is  abusive if it  is  below the  dominant company's average variable costs or if it 
is  below average total costs and  part of an  anti-competitive planM. 
If  a case arises, the  ONP rules concerning accounting requirements and transparency 
will help to  ensure the  ellective application of Article 86  in  this context. 
Where the operator is dominant in the product or services market, the margin between 
the  price  charged  to  all  competitors. on  the  downstream  market  (including  the 
dominant  company's own  downstream  operations,  if any)  for  access  and  the  price 
which the network operator charges in  the  downstream market must be  large enough 
to  allow a reasonably enicient service provider in  the  downstream market  to  obtain 
a normal profit unless the dominant company can show that its downstream operation 
is  exceptionally  erlicient.(>
7  If this  is  not  the  case,  competitors on  the  downstream 
market arc faced  by  a "price squeeze" which could force  them out of the market. 
The Commission Communication on Assessment Criteria for National Schemes for the 
Costing and  Financing of Universal Service and  Guidelines for the Operation of such 
Schemes will be  relevant for the  determination of the extent to  which  the  universal 
service obligation can  be  used  to justify the  prices charged.  See  also the  reference 
to  the  universal service obligation at paragraph 53  above. 
See AKZO,  case C-62/86,  [1991] ECR-3359 
However,  the average variable cost rule  cannot be  applied in  many  situations in  the 
telecommunications sector, since the variable costs of providing access to an already 
existing  network  are  almost  zero.  Accordingly,  the  test  which  the  Commission 
considers should be applied is whether  whether a company charges a price for goods 
and  services - other than  in the context of a new product or service -which,  although 
above the average variable cost of providing the specific goods or services for which 
the  price  in  question is paid  is  so  low that the  overall revenues  for all the goods or 
services in  question would be  less than  its average total costs of providing them if it 
sold the  same proportion of its output at the same price on  a continuing basis, even 
where no intent to  exclude a competitor is proved. 
Commission Decision, Brown Napier/British Sugar,  88/518/EEC, OJ L 284/41  (1988): 
the margin  between  industrial and  retail  prices was  reduced  to  the  point where the 
wholesale purchaser with packaging operations as efficient as those of the wholesale 
supplier could  not profitably serve the  retail  market  See also National Carbonising, 
footnote 57  above. 
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Discrimination 
93.  A dominant access provider may not discriminate between different access agreements 
where such discrimination would  restrict competition.  Any  di ffcrentiation  based on 
the  use  which  is  to  be  made  of the  access  rather  than  differences  between  the 
transactions for the access provider itself'.  if the discrimination is sufficiently likely to 
restrict  or distort  actual  or  potential  competition,  would  be  contrary  to  Article  86. 
This discrimination could take the form of imposing different conditions, including the 
charging of different prices, or otherwise differentiating between access agreements, 
except where such discrimination would  be  objectively justified, for  example on the 
basis  of cost or  technical  considerations or  the  fact  that  the  users  are  operating at 
different  levels.  Such  discrimination could  be  likely  to  restrict  competition  in  the 
downstream market on which the company requesting access was seeking to  operate, 
in that it might limit the possibility for  that operator to enter the market or expand its 
.  I  k  hX  operatiOns on  t 1at  mar ·et  . 
94.  With  regard  to  price  discrimination,  Article  86(c}  prohibits  discrimination  by  a 
dominant  firm  between  customers of that  firnt
1
,  including  discriminating  between 
customers on  the  basis  of whether  or  not  they  agree  to  deal  exclusively  with  that 
dominant firm. 
95. 
96. 
97. 
69 
70 
Discrimination without objective justification as  regards any  aspects or condition of 
an access agreement may  constitute an abuse.  Discrimination may  relate to  clements 
such as pricing, delays, technical access, routing
70
,  numbering, restrictions on network 
usc exceeding essential requirements and  use of  customer network data.  However, the 
existence  of discrimination  can  only  be  determined  on  a  case  by  case  basis. 
Discrimination is  contrary to  Article 86  whether or not  it  results from  or is apparent 
from  the terms of a particular access agreement. 
There is,  in  this context, a general duty on  the network operator to  treat independent 
customers in  the  same way  as  its  own  subsidiary or downstream service arm.  The 
nature of the  customer and  its  demands  may  play  a significant role  in  determining 
whether transactions arc comparable.  Different prices for customers at different levels 
(cg wholesale and  retail) do  not  necessarily constitute discrimination. 
Discrimination issues may arise in  respect of the technical configuration of the access, 
given  its  importance  in  the  context of access. 
However, when infrastructure capacity is under-utilised, charging a different price for 
access depending on the demand in the different downstream markets may be justified 
to  the  extent that such differentiation permits a better utilisation of the infrastructure 
and a better development of certain markets, and where such differentiation does not 
restrict or distort competition.  In  such a case,  the Commission will analyse the global 
effects of such  price differentiation on  all of the downstream markets. 
Case C-310/93 P,  BPB Industries PLC  and British Gypsum Ltd  v Commission [1995] 
ECR  1-865,  904,  applying to discrimination by  BPB  among customers  in  the related 
market for dry plaster 
ie to a preferred list of correspondent network operators 
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The degree o/teclmical sojJhist imt  ion oft  he access: restrictions on the type or 'level' 
in  the  network  hierarchy  of exchange  involved  in  the  access  or  the  technical 
capabilities of this exchange are of direct competitive significance.  These could be 
the  facilities available to  support a connection or the  type of  interl~1ce and signalling 
system used to  determine the  type of service available to  the party requesting access 
(e.g.  intelligent network  facilities). 
The  numher and/or  location  of' connection points:  the  requirement  to  collect  and 
distribute traflic for particular areas at the switch which directly serves that area rather 
than  at  a  higher  level  of the  network  hierarchy  may  be  important.  The  party 
requesting  access  incurs  additional  expense  by  either  providing  links  at  a  greater 
distance  from  its  own  switching  centre  or  being  liable  to  pay  higher  conveyance 
charges. 
/<,'qual access: the possibility for customers of the  party requesting access to obtain the 
services provided  by  the  access provider using the  same number of dialled  digits as 
arc  used  by  the  customers  of  the  latter  is  a  crucial  feature  of  competitive 
telecommunications. 
Objective  justification 
98.  These could  include  factors  relating to  the actual operation of the  network owned by 
the access provider, or licensing restrictions consistent with,  for example, the subject 
matter of intellectual  property  rights. 
2. 3  A huses (?/joint dominance 
99.  In  the  case of joint dominance (sec above,  points  65  et  seq.)  behaviour  by  one of 
several jointly dominant companies may  be  abusive even  if others are  not  behaving 
in  the  same way. 
I 00.  In addition to remedies under the competition rules, if no operator was willing to grant 
access, and  if there was  no  technical  or commercial justification for  the  refusal, one 
would  expect that  the  National  Regulatory  Authority  would  resolve the  problem  by 
ordering one  or more of the  companies to  offer access, under the  terms of the  ONP 
Directive or under national  law. 
3.  Access  a~rccmcnts (Article 85) 
I 0 I.  Restrictions of competition stemming from  access agreements may  have two distinct 
effects: to  restrict competition between the two  parties to  the access agreement, or to 
restrict competition from  third parties, for example through exclusivity for one or both 
of the  parties of the agreement.  In  addition, where one party  is dominant, conditions 
of the access agreement may  lead  to  a strengthening of that dominant position, or to 
an  extension  of that  dominant  position  to  a  related  market,  or  may  constitute  an 
unlawful exploitation of the dominant position through the imposition of unfair terms. 
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I  02.  Access  agreements  where  access  is  in  principle  unlimited  arc  not  likely  to  be 
restrictive of competition within the meaning of Article X5( I).  Exclusivity obligations 
in contracts providing access to one company arc likely to restrict competition because 
they  limit access to  infrastructure for  other companies.  Since  most networks have 
more capacity than  any  single user is  likely  to  need,  this will  normally be  the case in 
the  telecommunications sector. 
I 03.  Access agreements can  have significant pro-competitive effects as  they  can improve 
access to the downstream market.  Access agreements in the context of interconnection 
arc  essential  to  intcropcrability  of  services  and  infrastructure,  thus  increasing 
competition in  the downstream market  for  scrviccs, which is  likely to  involve higher 
added  value than  local  infrastructurc. 
I 04.  There  is,  however,  obvious  potcntial  for  anti-competitive  cff'ccts  of certain  access 
agrccments or clauses therein.  Access agreements may,  for  example: 
(a)  serve as  a means of coordinating prices; 
(b)  or  market sharing; 
(c)  have  exclusionary ci'f'ccts  on  third  parties
71
• 
(d)  lead to an exchange of commercially sensitive information between the  parties. 
I 05.  The risk of price coordination  is  particularly acute  in  the  telecommunications sector 
since  interconnection charges often amount  to  501 Ytl  or  more of the  total  cost of the 
services provided, and  where  interconnection  with  a dominant operator will  usually 
be  necessary.  In  these circumstances, the  scope for  price competition is  limited and 
the  risk (and  the seriousness) of price coordination correspondingly greater. 
I 06.  Furthermore, interconnection agreements between network operators may under certain 
circumstances  be  an  instrument  of market  sharing  between  the  network  operator 
providing access and  the  network operator seeking access, instead of the emergence 
of network competition between them. 
107.  In  a  liberalised  telecommunications environment.  thc  above  types  of restrictions of 
competition will  be  monitored by  the national authorities and  the Commission under 
the  competition  rules.  The  right  of parties  who  sutTer  from  any  type  of anti-
competitive  behaviour  to  complain  to  the  ( 'ommission  is  unartected  by  national 
regula! ion. 
71 
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( 'lauses falling  within  Article  X5( I) 
Commission  Decision,  Night  Services,  OJ  L 259/20  (1994);  Commission  Decision, 
Eurotunnel, OJ  L 354/66 (1994). 
] I \08. 
I 09. 
I I 0. 
II l. 
112. 
113. 
Draft 
The Commission has  identified  certain  types of restriction which  would  potentially 
infringe Article 85( I) EC and  therefore require individual exemption.  These clauses 
\viii  most commonly relate to  the commercial  framework of the access. 
In  the  telecommunications  sector,  interconnecting  parties  may  wish  to  exchange, 
customer and traffic information.  This exchange is likely to int1uence the competitive 
behaviour of the undertakings concerned, and  could easily be used by  the parties for 
collusive practices, such as  market sharin){.  Safeguards will  therefore be necessary 
to  ensure that  either confidential  information  is  only  disclosed to  those parts of the 
companies involved  in  making the  interconnection agreements, or to  ensure that the 
information is  not  used  for  anti-competitive purposes. 
Fxclusivity arrangements, l'or  example wher-e  tranic would  he  conveyed exclusively 
through  the  telecommunications  network  or one  or  both  parties  rather  than  to  the 
network of other parties  which  whom  <H:cess  agreements have  been  concluded  will 
similarly require analysis under /\rtick 85(.1).  If no ,iustification is  provided  ror such 
routing, such clauses will  he  prohibited. 
Access  agreement  that  have  been  concluded  with  an  anti-compel!trve  ol:ject  arc 
extremely  unlikely  to  rullil  the  criteria  ror  an  individual  exemption  under  Article 
85(3). 
Furthermore, access agreements may  have an  impact on the  competitive structure of 
the  market.  Local access charges will  ol'tcn account for a considerable portion or the 
total  cost of the  services provided  to  end-users by  the  party  requesting access,  thus 
leaving limited  scope  for  price competition.  Because of the  need  to  sa!'cguard  this 
limited degree of competition, the Commission will  therefore pay  particular attention 
to  scrutinising access agreements in  the context or their likely efkcts on the relevant 
markets in order to  ensure that such agreements do not serve as a hidden and indirect 
means  for  fixing  or co-ordinating end-prices  f(n end-users, which constitutes one of 
the  most serious infringements of /\rtiele 85  Fe'. 
In  addition,  clauses  involving  collective  diserimination  leading  to  the  exclusion of 
third  parties  arc  similarly  restrictive  of  competition.  The  most  important  is 
discrimination with regard  to  price, qual i  ly  or other commercially signi licant aspects 
or the access to  the detriment of the party requesting ucecss, which will generally aim 
al unfairly htvouring the operations or the access provider. 
Case T-34/92,  Fiatagri UK ltd and  New Holland Ford  Ltd  v Commission 
Case T/35/92,  John Deere Ltd  v Commission 
Both on  appeal to  the  ECJ 
Appealing  against  Commission  decision,  UK  Agricultural  Tractor  Registration 
Exchange,  OJ  L 68/19 (  1992). 
Case 8/72  Vereniging van  Cement/wndc/aaren v.  Commission (1972] ECR 977; 
Cnse 123/83 Bureau Nationa/lntcrprofcsswnne/ du Cognac v.  Clair (1985] ECR 391; 
\ \dr-cons. wpd Draft 
4.  Effect on  trade between Member States 
114.  The application of hoth Article 85  and Article 86 requires an effect on trade between 
Member States. 
115.  In order for an agreement to have an effect on trade between Member States, 
116. 
117. 
118. 
l4 
75 
7G 
it  must he possible for  the Commission to: 
·:ti>re.H'L'  with  a  .wf/icient  degree  ol pmhahi/ity  on  the  hasis  t?{ a  set  (?l 
ol?iectil•e factors ollmt• or t?ffac/ that the agreement in question may lwt•e an 
il?fluence,  direct  or  !ndirec/,  actual  or  jJOtential,  on  the  J>allern  of' lrm/e 
he/ween Memher ,\'taiL's. "
7~ 
It is  not necessary for each of the restrictions of competition within the agreement to 
he capable of affecting tradc
75
,  provided the agreement as a whole does so. 
As regards access agreements in the telecommunications sector, the Commission will 
consider not only the direct effect of restrictions of competition on inter-state trade in 
access  markets,  hut  also  the  effects  on  inter-state  trade  in  downstream 
telecommunications services.  The Commission will  also consider the  potential of 
these  agreements  to  foreclose  a  given  geographic  market  which  could  prevent 
undertakings  already  established  in  other  Member  States  from  competing  in  this 
geographic market. 
Telecommunications access agreements will  normally affect trade  between  Member 
States as services provided over a  network arc traded  throughout the  EU  and access 
agreements may govern the ability of a service provider or an operator to provide any 
given  service
7 ~>.  Even where markets arc mainly national, as is generally the case at 
present given the  stage of development of liheralisation,  abuses of dominance will 
normally speaking affect market structure, leading to repercussions on trade between 
Member States. 
Cases in  this  area  involving  issues  under  Article  86  will  relate  either  to  abusive 
clauses  in  access  agreements,  or  a  refusal  to  conclude  an  access  agreement  on 
appropriate terms or at all.  As such, the criteria listed above for determining whether 
an access agreement is  capable of affecting trade between Member States would he 
equally relevant here. 
Case 56/65,  STM,  1966 ECR 235 at 249. 
Case 193/83, Windsurfing International Inc v Commission, 1986 ECR 611. 
See Telecommunications Guidelines, point 3 above. 
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Conclusions 
II<J.  The Commission considers that competition rules and  sector specilic regulation  form 
a coherent set of measures to ensure a liberalised and competitive market environment 
for  telecommunications markets in  thL'  Fll. 
120.  In  taking  action  in  this  sector,  the  Commission  will  aim  to  avoid  unnecessary 
duplication  of procedures.  in  particular  competition  procedures  and  national  I  EU 
regulatory procedures as  set out under the  ON P framework. 
121.  Where competition rules are invoked the Commission will consider which markets arc 
relevant and  will  apply  Articles  R5  and  X(>  in  accordance with the  principles set out 
above. 
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